



















Department “Economia e Territorio” – University of Cassino, Italy 




Department “Economia e Territorio” – University of Cassino, Italy 








Paper prepared for presentation at the XI International Congress of the EAAE  
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  
“The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System”,  







Copyright 2005 by Carlo Russo.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
   
  2
Incentives to Efficient Investment Decisions in Agricultural Cooperatives 
By Carlo Russo and Massimo Sabbatini
(*) 
 
Abstract.  Recent studies have questioned the competitiveness of agricultural cooperatives in an industrialized 
food system, based on empirical results and economic theory. New organizational institutions have been 
proposed to overcome the cooperative main weaknesses (the so called new generation cooperatives). In this 
paper, we provide a simple model based on a financial approach to address the issue of cooperative 
competitiveness and to assess the investment efficiency of both traditional and new generation cooperatives. 
The main conclusions of the analysis are: i) cooperatives (both traditional and new generation ones) may have 
incentive to adopt projects that do not maximize the Net Present Value of the firm ii) the institutions of new 
generation cooperatives are not sufficient to ensure net present value maximization, even though they address 
some of the main concerns of traditional cooperatives iii) traditional cooperatives may have a competitive 
advantage in businesses that require the aggregation of a large number of farmers. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural Cooperatives, Investment Efficiency 
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Introduction 
The role of agricultural cooperatives in an industrialized food system is a major concern for 
researcher in the field. Particularly, since early 1990’s, sluggish or even declining performances, 
illustrious bankruptcies and the rise of new organization forms (such as the new generation 
cooperatives) have brought new intensity in the debate. The main question is related to the possibility 
for cooperatives to compete successfully in the food market with Investor Owned Firms (IOF), given 
their unique institutions. The same question has been posed in many different ways, for a long time 
and with different approaches and answers. Authors wondered if traditional cooperatives “have 
outlived their usefulness” (Stewart 1993) or are “under-performers by nature” (Hind 1994), what 
would be the (grim) implications of industrialization for supply cooperatives (Coffey 1993). The 
comparative efficiency of cooperatives has been both questioned and supported  (Porter and Scully 
1987, Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Sexton and Iskow, 1993, Hendrikse 1998, just to quote a few). In 
mid-90’s the future role of cooperative was considered an open question (Fulton, 1995; Cook 1995). 
Increasingly, literature has been linking the efficiency of cooperatives as ownership structure to 
market imperfections such as transaction costs, incomplete contracts or moral hazard (Staatz 1987, 
Fulton 1995, Hendrikse 2001, Hendrikse and Bijman 2002; Hueth, Marcoul and Ginder 2003). 
The arguments in support of inefficiency of traditional cooperatives have been summarized and 
organized in an original framework by Cook et al. using a neo-institutional approach: the “vaguely/ill 
defined” property rights in traditional cooperative institution hinder competitiveness and makes them 
more vulnerable in the market (Cook 1995, Iliopoulos and Cook 1999, Cook and Iliopoulos 2000, 
Sykuta and Cook 2001). New Generation Cooperative (NGC) are then considered as a “new and 
improved” institutions, overcoming the weaknesses of the traditional associations
1. However, Recent 
developments, question the unconditional success of the NGC and call for a critical look at the new 
trends (Torgerson 2001).  
In this paper we focus on a specific attribute of efficiency: the investment of financial resources in 
value maximizing activities. The topic is relevant since undercapitalization and financial constraints 
are often considered cooperatives’ most important strategic weaknesses. Then the ability of 
cooperatives of allocating the scarce financial resources in value maximizing projects is a key 
determinant of efficiency.  
                                                 
(*) Carlo Russo and Massimo Sabbatini are, respectively, Associate Professor and Full Professor in Agricultural 
Economics at the Department “Economia e Territorio” of the University of Cassino, Italy. The paper is a joint 
effort of the authors, however Conclusions are attributed to Prof. Sabbatini and the rest of the paper and the 
appendix to Prof. Russo. 
1 The distinctive characteristics of new generation cooperatives, compared to traditional cooperatives are closed 
(limited) membership and the regulation  of patronage via delivery rights (i.e. the quantity of products that 
members can deliver to the cooperative is proportional to the equity shares). Also, NGC are characterized by 
relevant upfront capital investment and a value-added focus. For a more detailed description, see Fulton 2001.   
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The goal of the paper is to provide a simple financial model to evaluate investment efficiency in 
agricultural cooperatives. Financial theory is particularly useful to address issues related with 
investment decisions and its use is not new in cooperative studies (Cotterill 1987, Peterson 1992, 
Sporleder and Zeuli 2000, Bailey and Sporleder 2000). The main objective is to compare the 
efficiency of traditional and new generation cooperative in the allocation of financial resources. 
 
An efficiency criterion for investment decision  
In this section we provide a general efficiency criterion for the investment decision. Such criterion 
will allow us to compare the investment decision processes of IOF, NGC and TC and to contrast the 
relative efficiency in the use of the financial resources. In particular, the goal is to assess if any 
organization form provides better incentive to an efficient allocation of the resources. 
The analysis relies on the following assumptions: 
•  No agency problem arises with managers
2. The managers simply carry out the majority 
decision. This assumption implies that the organization (either IOF or cooperative) will adopt 
the investment decision that is supported by the majority of the shareholders/members. As a 
consequence, to describe the firm behavior it is sufficient to model the shareholders/members’ 
decision to support or oppose investment projects. Following Staatz’s terminology, it is 
assumed that the cooperative is a coalition composed only of groups of patrons (Staatz 1983). 
•  The objective of the member/investor is to maximize the present value of their wealth. They 
will support any (legal) decision if the present value of the appropriable differential cash 
flows is positive. The term appropriable indicates that the member/investor only considers his 
private benefit (the cash flows he can appropriate of) and has no utility from the value of the 
firm/cooperative per se. 
•  Markets are complete, competitive
3 efficient and in equilibrium. 
•  All the investment decisions are financed with equity (i.e. no debts and no bankruptcy) 
 
Assume that an IOF and a cooperative are considering adopting a new investment. Given the 
assumptions, the project is approved if it increases the expected present wealth of the majority of the 
members/investors. Exhibit 1 compares the evaluation criterion for the appropriable differential cash 
flows of a IOF investor, a TC patron and a NGC member, respectively - for an investment that 
requires an initial payment of I and yields a stream of differential cash flows for the firm F 
4. The 
Exhibit reports both the project’s NPV and the member’s appropriable NPV .  
In this paper, the investment NPV – i.e. the present value of the asset, evaluated according 
elementary financial theory ( for ex. Brealey and Myers 1996) – is used as an efficiency benchmark. It 
                                                 
2 This assumption is particularly strong in the cooperative case. Authors stressed the influence of managers on 
the cooperative decision processes and financial structure  (Murray 1983, Staatz 1987b, Russo et al. 2000) . In a 
TC the agency problem is considered more severe than in IOF. 
3 The assumption of perfectly competitive markets simplifies the analysis, but is extremely restrictive. An 
extensive literature associates cooperatives to imperfect markets and the presence of market power or transaction 
costs (for example Sexton 1990). Perfect competition can be justified by assuming that the cooperative 
successfully solved the competitive problem. The assumption simplifies the model because it implies that there 
is no difference in the prices that TC, NGC and IOF face if operating in the same market. 
4 The goal of the table is to provide a simple comparison, so additional assumptions have been introduced to 
simplify notation. In particular: 
•  The firm organization does not influence the differential cash flows (i.e. F is considered the same for an 
IOF, a TC or a NGC). This assumption requires for example that cooperatives and  IOF set production 
at the same level. The previous assumption of competitive markets makes the this hypothesis less 
heroic. 
•  The differential cash flows do not depend  on members’ participation. Also there is no free rider 
problem (this hypothesis can be considered as a consequence of the assumption of competitive 
markets). 
•  The only effect of the investment on member/investor present wealth is the appropriable differential 
cash flows. This implies that investors do no change their portfolio or members do not adjust the 
production/demand for the goods that are not marketed/sold by the cooperative. Such assumption will 
be relaxed later, in a more formal analysis.   
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is assumed that an investment decision that maximizes the project’s NPV is efficient. The criterion is 
justified by the assumption of perfect markets. In fact the IOF/cooperative can realize the value-
maximizing investment, then sell it on the market (for the equilibrium price NPVf ) and use the 
complete financial market to compose a portfolio to duplicate any other stream of cash-flow. Since the 
investment is value maximizing and markets are efficient, the price of the portfolio is lower than 
NPVf. Then by adopting the value maximizing investment, the IOF/cooperative can grant 
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then NPVS = δ NPVF 
Exhibit 1: Comparison of investment evaluations in IOF, TC, NGC 
 
In Exhibit 1, Ft is the net differential cash flow from the investment in year t, T is the duration of 
the investment (economic life), r is the appropriate discount rate for the investment, H is the number of 
periods after which the investor plan to divest from the project (investor’s time horizon), SVH is the 
value of the stocks at time H, I is the initial cost of the investment, α is the investor’s share in the IOF, 
ϕt is the TC member’s patronage share in year t,  β is the TC member’s equity share and δ is the NGC 
member’s share of delivery rights and i is the interest rate utilized in the individual investor evaluation 
(see later). 
The formulas for IOFs are elementary financial theory. The cases of TC and NGC need comment. 
In a TC the appropriable NPV depends on patronage: in each year patrons can claim a share ϕt of the 
cooperative cash flow that, unlike IOF, may vary over time and it is not necessarily proportional to the 
share of the equity investment (β). Furthermore, since the equity investment is reimbursed at face 
value (βI), a member leaving the cooperative at time H will not received the value of the expected 
future benefits – originating the well-known horizon problem (Vitaliano 1983). Because of TC unique 
institutions (open membership, remuneration proportional to the use and unlimited delivery rights) the 
member’s  appropriable NPV (NPVs)is not a fix proportion of the investment NPV (NPVf). As a 
consequence, influence and control costs may be more severe in TC than in IOF. Members have two 
ways to increase NPVs : either increase the project value (NPVf) or increase ϕt , being βI given. A 
member may prefer an investment with a lower total NPV, if he can appropriate of an higher share of 
the benefits. Managerial practice offer clear examples of this conclusion: in multiproduct cooperatives, 
individual patrons may support less profitable investments benefiting the commodities they trade, 
rather than higher value projects benefiting other patrons. Small farmers may support expenditures 
aimed to reduce on-farm fix costs rather than more profitable investments increasing the per-unit 
margins.  
In general, the principle of separation between investment decision and investors’ personal 
preferences  does not apply to TC. This happens because, in a cooperative, the production decision 
affects the distribution of the benefits across members. As a consequence, production decisions that 
are not maximizing total value are possible if the majority of members can appropriate of higher value 
through a different distribution of the surplus. In a TC we have a tension between efficiency and 
bargaining. Standard corporate finance theory assumes homogeneity of shareholder objectives (i.e. 
investors are interested only in value maximization). In a cooperative, instead different individual   
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evaluations introduce heterogeneity in members’ objectives and originate well-known management 
challenges (Emilianoff 1942). The consequences of heterogeneity in the evaluation of the cooperative 
benefits have been extensively described in literature (Sexton 1986); in the next section the financial 
approach provides an insight into the causes. 
The investment evaluation by a NGC member differs from the TC case. The property rights 
approach concludes that NGC institutions may overcome (at least partially) TC’s efficiency problem. 
The financial model suggests that the conclusion holds only under two specific conditions, to be 
discussed in the next section.  Exhibit 1 shows that under such conditions: i) NGC the members’ 
evaluation of the investment is analogous to IOF shareholder ii) in IOF and NGC, the expected NPV 
for the individual investor is a share of the total NPV which equals the stock/delivery right share. This 
implies that, to maximize the appropriable returns, both IOF shareholder and NGC members must 
support the maximization of the total NPV (and/or buy more shares/delivery rights). Under the given 
conditions, no heterogeneous evaluation should be possible.  
The proposed framework suggests that NGC may be more efficient in investing financial 
resources. However the conclusion holds only under two specific conditions, in the next section the 
implications of such conditions are discussed. 
 
Condition for NGC investment efficiency 
In section 1 we just observed that NGC can provide incentives to value-maximizing production 
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(i.e. the individual member value is a fixed proportion of the total value, corresponding to the share of 












SV   i.e. if the salvage value of the cooperative shares equals the present 
value of future cash flows 
2)   i = r      i.e. if the discount rate utilized in the individual member’s evaluation 
is the same for all patrons (actual and future) and equals the discount rate for the “market” 
evaluation. The notions of market and individual interest rates need clarification. The market 
interest rate defines the interest rate that an investor holding the market portfolio would apply. 
In this paper, we assume that i) such value can be described by the Capital Asset Price Model 
(Lintner 1965)
 5, ii) this value is consistent with the market price for the asset, in equilibrium. 
The individual member’s interest rate is the interest rate that a patron of a cooperative is using 
in his evaluation.  
 
Condition 1) implies an efficient secondary market for the cooperative stocks/delivery rights. Such 
assumption may be unrealistic if the number of potential buyers (i.e. of producers in the area) is thin. 
Also, note that if condition 2) is not satisfied (the member’s interest rate differs from the market one), 
then the salvage value of the NGC participation is not equal to the member’s evaluation of the present 
value of the future expected benefit. 
Condition 2) requires that all members use in their evaluation the “market” interest rate (CAPM). 
This implies that patron’s individual characteristics/preferences do not influence their required returns, 
the minimum expected returns that the member is willing to accept for the equity investment . The 
                                                 
5 The choice of CAPM as financial framework is due to the goal of providing a simple model. The use of CAPM 
for cooperative studies has been extensively discussed by Cotterill (1987). Moreover, the existence of a close 
relation between risk and equity investment in cooperatives has been empirically tested (Parliament and Lerman 
1993), providing the basic argument for the applicability of CAPM. Also Arthur, Carter and Abizadeh suggested 
that, in agriculture, the results obtained using CAPM may be consistent to the ones obtained with more 
sophisticated model like arbitrage price model (APT) (Arthur, Carter and Abizadeh, 1988).    
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main point of this section is to prove that i) that the two values may diverge ii) individual interest rate 
may diverge across members.  
 
It is possible to support the claim that individual preferences and production characteristics are 
determinants of the individual discount rate for TC and NGC members by comparing the application 
of the CAPM framework to capital investor and to cooperative members. The following analysis 
shows that the results of the model can be quite different if the agents considering the investment are 
patrons of a cooperative (both TC and NGC): in the text a graphical presentation is offered, while a 
formal proof is reported in appendix (for an almost direct application of standard CAPM to 
cooperatives, see Cotterill 1987). 
Merely for comparison purpose, Graph 1 reproduces Lintner’s approach to the investment decision 
by IOF shareholders. The graphs contrast two agents with different degrees of risk aversion (Mr. A is 
more risk averse than Mr. B) in a risk/return space
6. Each point in the graph represents the pair of risk 
and returns; the shaded area represents the risk and returns of each possible portfolio in the market. 
Under the hypothesis of complete financial market, the such set is convex. According the general 
framework, both investors will hold the same market portfolio (point M) regardless individual 
preferences (the two indifference curves are represented). Risk aversion only determines the share of 
individual wealth invested in the market portfolio and in the risk-free asset. Under the condition of 
market equilibrium, both investor will have an expected required return for the investment equal to 
( ) ( )β − = −
0 m a









Figure 1: investor in IOF (Lintner 1965) 
 
Graph 1 just repeats the CAPM framework for IOF investors. However the direct application to 
farmers and cooperatives of the model can be questionable and requires further adjustment. In 
particular, it must be considered:  
•  Cooperative participation constraint. To be part of a cooperative, the agents need to be 
farmers. Obviously, this implies that they cannot sell out the farm entirely. Also they need to 
produce/consume the goods traded by the cooperative. This implicitly means that the farm 
business cannot be reorganized without constraints (the farm business cannot switch from 
poultry to organic tomatoes, for example).  
•  Limited portfolio. Because of the constraint on the farm investment,  some of the portfolios 
available in the financial marked may not be feasible for the farmers. Hanson and Myers note 
that farmers generally “do not hold diversified portfolio, preferring to concentrate most of 
their assets in on-farm investments and less risky financial investments such as treasury bonds 
and certificate of deposits” (Hanson and Myers 1995). Then a limited portfolio approach can 
be more appropriate (Levy, 1978). To keep the presentation simple, in Graph 2, it is assumed 
                                                 
6 Risk is measured by the standard deviation of the returns.   
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that the only assets available to the farmers are the farm, the risk-free asset and the 
cooperative; a more general and formal approach is presented in the appendix. 
•  Indivisibility equity investment (for TC only). In a TC, the equity investment is fixed (the face 
value of the shares). The farmers cannot either participate or not, they cannot adjust their 
investment (differentiate) to match their risk aversion (Vitaliano 1983). In the model is 
assumed that the amount of wealth invested in a TC is fixed. 
•  Subsidiary nature of cooperative returns The cooperative participation is an unique asset. 
Unlike standard financial investment, it does not yield returns per se (i.e. without the farm 
asset) but it affects the probability distribution (both in expectation and standard deviation) of 
the farm returns. By joining the cooperative, the farmer creates a composed asset (farm and 
the cooperative participation, the farm-cooperative asset) that yields a return that depends 
both on the farm characteristics and the cooperative investment. The differential returns from 
the cooperative can be defined as the difference between the revenues from the cooperative 
portfolio and the revenues from the farm. Note that the probability distribution of the total 
revenues from the cooperative portfolio depends on the expected differential returns (µc), their 
variance and their covariance with the farm asset. 
 
Graph 2 illustrates the effects of these conditions in the determination of the investment decision 
of TC and NGC alike. In the graph, are reported four points, r
0, F, F+C and F+C’, representing three 
assets: respectively the risk-free asset, the farm, the farm-cooperative asset without and with the new 
investment. Unlike the standard CAPM model, the farmers have a limited-asset availability (only three 
assets are available) and are subjected to the cooperative participation constraint (they cannot choose 
any point on the line connecting point F+C or F+C’ to r
0, they can only reach a portfolio on the solid 
part of the lines). Note that once the farmers join the cooperative they just consider the aggregate 
returns from the cooperative portfolio. 
Graph 2 describes the choice between two alternative investments by the cooperative in two cases: 
(a) the only two members of the cooperative have identical farm structure (the points F, F+C and F+C’ 
coincide) but different risk aversion  and (b) the farmers have the same preferences (the indifference 
curves Ua and Ub coincide) but different farm structure. The goal of the graph is to provide an 
intuitive argument supporting the possibility that TC members have divergent evaluation of the same 
investment project. 
The investment that the cooperative is considering will affect the risk/return ratio of the patrons, 
then – in this simple one-period framework – they will support the project only if it allows them to 
reach an higher indifference curve . Each farmer has three options: support the new investment, 
oppose it but stay in the cooperative or oppose it abd leave the cooperative if approved (in this case he 
can quit farming as well, i.e. invest all his wealth in the risk-free asset). Figure 2 illustrates the options 
in the risk/return space.  
 
graph 2a   Ub
returns
   Ua   
















Figure 2: CAPM for TC members (a) Same farm assets, different preferences (b) different farm assets, 
same preferences 
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In both cases members have different evaluations: farmer B supports the investment, while farmer 
A (the more risk-averse one) does not. Since farmer A is not free to mix the portfolio F+C’ with the 
risk-free asset in the optimal proportion (he should divest too much from farm operation), he prefers 
the less risky portfolio F+C. This result is similar to the portfolio problem detected by Vitaliano 
(1983) but the causes are linked not only to the indivisibility of the TC investment, but also to the 
nature of the farm operations that are required to participate to the cooperative.  
The same conclusions hold for NGC. In this case, i) the constraint of indivisibility of equity 
investment  is not longer applicable, ii) the participation constraint depends on the level of the 
investment in the cooperative (the farmer must be able to honor the delivery rights). Graph 3 illustrates 
the decision problem for NGC in the case of two farmers with identical farms and different 














Graph 3: Cooperative investment decision for NGC members with different risk aversion 
 
As in the previous case, four points are reported in the risk/returns space: the risk-free asset (r
0), 
the farm asset (F), the cooperative portfolio F+C (i.e. the portfolio with the maximum investment in 
the cooperative, given that the cooperative does not realize the new investment), the cooperative 
portfolio F+C’ (with the new investment). Because the equity investment is not fixed, as in TC, the 
farmer can mix the investment in the cooperative with the farm asset, moving along the line joining F 
with F+C or F with F+C’. Moreover by mixing the cooperative portfolio with the risk-free asset the 
farmer can reach any point in the sets Ω and Ω’ (depending on the cooperative investment). Note that 
the shape of Ω and Ω’ is the result of the limited portfolio assumption and the participation 
constraint
7. In the graphical example, we have a divergence in investment evaluation between the two 
patrons: farmer A, more risk averse, opposes the new investment, while farmer B supports it. In NGC, 
the final investment decision is influenced by members’ preferences (risk aversion) and by the 
distribution of the specific farm returns (and their covariance with the differential returns from the 
cooperative).
 
 According to the proposed financial framework, both for TC and NGC, the condition i = r (i.e. the 
equality of interest rate across members and to the market) can be satisfied only if:  
•  members have similar farm structure / probability of the farm returns 
•  the participation constraint is not binding (or the farmers have similar risk aversion) 
•  the farmers have similar off-farm investment 
•  the farmers invest in the cooperative a similar share of their wealth 
 




                                                 
7 In particular, because of the cooperative participation constraint, the set Ω is a sub-set of the triangle r
0-F-F+C, 
representing all the possible combination of the three assets. Similarly  Ω’ is a sub-set of the triangle r
0-F-F+C’.   
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Heterogeneous evaluations and efficient investment decision in TC and NGC 
If farmers have farm operations with different returns probability distribution or different activity 
portfolio, wealth or preferences, NGC and TC could adopt investment that are not value maximizing. 
The possibility of inefficient investment needs further discussion. The heterogeneity of evaluations, in 
fact, suggests that the investment decision should be the result of a bargaining activity among 
members. Coase theorem, in fact, states that « if the parties bargain to efficient agreement (for 
themselves) and if their preferences display no wealth effects, then the value-creating activities (y) that 
they will agree upon do not depend on the bargaining power of the parties or on what asset each 
owned when the bargaining began. Rather efficiency alone determines the activity choice. The other 
factors can affect only decisions about how the costs and benefits are to be shared »  (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992; Coase 1960) 
 
The question is why members do not agree on the value maximizing investment and later on 
compensate the patrons with higher required returns from the efficient project. Three major obstacles 
may prevent the efficient bargaining among parties:  
i)  the principle of benefit proportional to the use. In a cooperative, the benefits should be 
distributed according to the use. This simple and fundamental rule may be incompatible 
with a full compensation of the members with higher required returns from the efficient 
investment.  
ii)  opportunistic behavior by members. The compensation of members opposing the efficient 
investment implies that the individual required returns must be known. However, required 
returns depends on specific characteristics such as the individual farm operations or risk 
aversion, that are difficult to monitor for the other members. Then patrons have incentive 
to pretend to oppose the investment to gain the compensation. The adverse selection 
problem may prevent the efficient bargaining and may make inapplicable the Coase 
theorem. 
iii)  internal transaction costs. Bargaining among members can be costly, especially if the 
patrons have heterogeneous characteristics. If the cost of bargaining is high enough, 
patrons may agree on an inefficient investment, rather than strive for the value 
maximizing investment. 
 
Compared to TCs, NGCs are able to reduce members’ heterogeneity via a self selection argument. 
By requiring a sizable upfront capital investment, NGC are implicitly selecting potential members 
with homogeneous investment evaluations. Farmers, who decide to invest in the cooperative, accept 
the marketing plan and consequently agree on the main production decision. For any given internal 
rate of return of the project, the farmers joining the NGC are expected to have lower risk aversion 
and/or larger farms (the participation constraint is less binding), higher differential returns from the 
cooperative, lower correlation between the differential returns and the farm returns. Note also that, 
since the required returns increases with the share of wealth invested in the cooperative (see 
appendix), the self selection argument is stronger in NGC that in TC. However, the more homogeneity 
obtained via members’ self-selection does not ensure that patrons use in their investment evaluation 
the CAPM. 
Summarizing, NGC institutions do not eliminate the possibility of inefficient investment decision, 
but can reduce the heterogeneity in the investment evaluation via a more direct link between cost and 
benefits (delivery rights and close membership, as seen in section 2) and via self-selection.  
 
Conclusions. 
The financial framework concluded that cooperative investments are not evaluated per se. On the 
contrary the effect on the members’ farm operations is a  critical determinant. This point has a major 
impact when the cooperative is considering a project that affects the core business (for example, 
dismissing an activity). In this case, members that are willing to patronize the cooperative are 
requested to adjust their farm operations accordingly. Members with a positive present value of the 
appropriable differential cash-flow of the farm-cooperative asset will support the project, while the 
others will oppose it. The proposed model suggests that both TC and NGC are more likely to reject a 
value-maximizing business restructuring than IOF, if members have high asset specificity to the   
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current transaction with the cooperative. If farmers’ assets are specific, then the value gain from the 
cooperative change in strategy may be offset by the loss of asset value. This point may explain why 
both TC and NGC may be more vulnerable to change in the strategic environment than IOF. 
Although no empiric evidence can be provided, this issue is expected to be more relevant for 
NGC. The value added focus and the large capital investment, in fact, make more likely that farmers 
invest in specific on-farm assets. In any case, the model suggests that transforming a TC into a NGC 
may not solve business crisis, if a radical repositioning of the core business is needed. 
Finally, the framework suggests that TC may be more efficient in managing business with 
economies of scale in member participation. Besides the obvious effect of closed membership, the 
already described member self-selection mechanism can prevent farmers to join the cooperative, even 
if delivery rights are available. In addition, in NGC farmers’ incentive to patronize depends on 
individual factors that may vary over time, according with preferences, market conditions and the 
distribution of the farm returns. One of the key benefits of close membership is that a member who has 
no incentive to participate anymore can sell his share for a price. However if there are no farmers with 
lower required returns in the secondary market for the delivery rights, the patron may have incentive 
to stay in the cooperative supporting inefficient investments (to increase the appropriable benefit). 
The long run investment efficiency of NGCs requires the existence of potential buyers of delivery 
rights. A simple consequence is that a NGC cannot aggregate all the potential members and therefore 
cannot fully benefit of the economies of scale in membership (for example acting as 
monopolist/monopsonist, according to Sapiro’s approach). 
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The goal of this appendix is to provide a formal proof of the conclusion stated in section 3. By 
using a graphical approach, we found that TC and NGC members may use a discount rate that depends 
on individual characteristics. Here we derive the “required returns” (which, added to the risk-free rate 
of give the appropriate interest rate) as the solution of the expected utility maximization  of a risk 
averse farmer with  a VonNeumann Morgerstern (VNM) utility function.  
The analysis modifies the standard CAPM approach (Lintner 1965) by introducing additional 
assumption to model the investment in a cooperative (TC or NGC). under a budget constraint, a 
limited portfolio and with no short selling of real assets. Additional constraints are added for the TC 
and NGC cases. Section 1 proposes – for a direct comparison – the analysis of an investment in a IOF 
(graph 1 in the text), section 2 describes the participation in a TC (Figure 2) and section 3 apply the 
model to a NGC (Figure3). 
 
Operators  
Et-1 :  conditional expectation to the information 
available at time t-1 
Covt-1: conditional covariance to the information 
available at time t-1 
 Vart-1: conditional variance to the information 
available at time t-1 
Variables   
x indicates the share of wealth invested in any 
asset. In particular: 
x
r
: is the vectors of share of wealth invested in 
each asset 
x
c: is the share of wealth invested in the 
cooperative 
x
f:  is the share of wealth invested in the farm 
x
k: is the share of wealth invested in a financial 
asset k 
x
0: is the share of wealth invested in the risk-free 
asset 
µ is the rate of return from a unit investment in 
any asset. In particular 
µf : is the rate of return from the farm if the farmer 
does not join the cooperative (note: the free 
rider effect is included) 
µf+c : is the rate of return from the composed asset 
farm+ cooperative 
µc : is the virtual rate of return from the 






µk : is the rate of return from a financial asset k 
µ0 : is the rate of return from the risk-free asset 
Ω is the set of the available financial assets 
(excluding the risk-free asset) 
y indicates the excess return of any asset with 
respect to the risk-free asset. For any asset a 
we have y
a  =  µa-µ0. When y is part of a 
solution of the umax problem it can be 
referred as “required returns” 
W is the wealth endowment  R indicates the net revenues from the investments 
ψ are the states of nature  ϕ(ψ) is the pdf of the states of nature 
C is a binary variable describing the presence or 
absence of investment in a TC 
U is the VNM utility function of the farmer 

















Table A-1: Notation 
 
Section 1. Investment in a IOF. 
This sections reports the problem of the investment decision for an investment in a IOF under the 
following assumptions: 
•  The investor is not necessarily a farmer. If the investor is a farmer, he can sell out the farm and 
act as a pure financial investor 
•  The investor has a limited endowment W (budget constraint)   
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•  The investor has access to limited investment opportunities (he can choose his asset only from 
the set Ω)  
•  The investor considers the rate of returns on the investments as given 
The solution of this umax problem is reported only for providing an easy comparison to the next 
sections. The only difference to the intermediate finance textbook CAPM is the introduction of the 
constraint on  the available investment opportunities, which was derived by Levy (Levy, 1978) 
 Using the notation described in table A-1, the umax problem of the investor is: 
 
() () [ ] {}
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Assuming local nonsatiation of the farmer’s preferences and production efficiency, we can 
substitute the two constraints in the objective function and obtain the following first order conditions. 
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Condition 1) describe the rule for the optimal investment in the IOF (marginal benefit – marginal 
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Assuming that R and µi are distributed according a multivariate normal, we can apply Stein’s 
lemma (Stein 1973, Rubinstein 1976): cov(x,g(y)) = E(g’(x))cov(x,y) to obtain: 
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− − − , cov  and  therefore 
































− , which is the standard CAPM formulation. It is 
possible to obtain a formulation which is independent from the individual preferences by dividing 
condition 1) by the sum of condition 2) to Ω): 
 
() ()
() () ∑ ∑
− − = k 1 t
k
i








In this basic case, the condition for homogeneous required returns (and evaluations of the IOF 
investment) is that the set Ω of available financial assets is the same for all farmers. Moreover, if there 
is no constraint on Ω (i.e. the farmers have full access to the financial market), the result coincide with 
CAPM. 
 
Section 2. The TC investment decision.   
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In this section, the standard CAPM is modified to describe the optimal investment in a TC. According 
to the discussion in the text the following additional assumptions are introduced: 
Assumptions:  
•  Indivisibility of the cooperative participation. The cooperative participation is a discrete 
choice (yes/no). If the farmer choose to join, he must pay a fix equity share
c x , in exchange, 
he can claim the returns from the composed asset µf+c 
•  Cooperative participation constraint. If the farmer joins the cooperative, he must invest in the 
farm at least 
f x (he must be a farmer and produce the commodities traded by the cooperative) 
•  Subsidiary nature of cooperative returns.If the farmer join the cooperative, then we have a 
new real asset: farm+cooperative that yields a return µf+c(ψ) which is a function of the state of 
nature. Note that the probability µf+c(ψ) depends among others, on the probability distribution 
of the farm revenues and of the cooperative revenues (and on their covariance). The 
differential return rate from the cooperative is µc(ψ,x






c f x x x x µ + µ = µ + + .  
•  As in the previous section, we assume the availability of a limited portfolio. 
 










if the farmer does not join the cooperative 
if the farmer joins the cooperative 
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0
1 k
k c f = + + + ∑
Ω
=
 (with equality, assuming local non satiation) 
f f x x ≥  for c = 1  (coop. participation constraint) 
x
f ≥ 0  for c = 0   (no short selling on farm asset) 
 
The first order conditions are: 
 
F.O.C. 












0 k 1 t




















































⎧ µ − µ
∂
∂
























The solution for the case c=0 is trivial and similar to the one presented in section 1. For c=1, condition 
1) can be written as: 
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Assuming  that the variables are distributed as multivariate normal, it is possible to apply Stein’s 
lemma  to obtain: 
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Applying basic property of covariance and expectation: 
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 and rearranging: 
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θ + θ = − − − −  
 









µ ∂ + . Substituting and 
rearranging we have  () ( )() R u
y R y E c f 1 t c f 1 t '
, cov
ρ + λ
− θ = + − + −   
 
Which shows that the farmer only considers the returns on the composed asset farm + 
cooperative, disregarding the separate assets
8. The condition for utility maximization simply compares 
marginal benefits (the increase in expected returns by switching investment from the risk-free asset to 
the farm) and marginal cost (the increase in the risk of the portfolio). The marginal benefit is the given 
by the excess returns on farm operation (yf = µf+µ0) plus the expected variation in the returns from the 
cooperative (the sum of these terms defines the increase in the return on the portfolio composed of the 
farm and the cooperative participation). The increase in the wealth risk can be broken in several 
components: the variance of the returns on the farm, the covariance with the financial assets and the 
effect of the cooperative returns (the direct covariance and an interaction term taking into account the 
change in the returns of the cooperative due to the change in farm investment). 
Note that because of the participation and short sell constraints the solution of the optimization 
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which is independent from preferences only if λ=ρ=0 (i.e. the constraints are not binding).  Also note 
that the required returns on the composed asset f+c: 
() ()




+ − = k 1 t
k 1 t
c f 1 t






 may depend on individual characteristics of the farmer, 
even for interior solutions. Namely: 
•  The set of available/held financial assets Ω (Levy1978) 
                                                 
8 This conclusion is relevant because it questions the management practices aimed to grant farmers higher 
returns on the capital investments to give incentive to provide additional equity (Peterson 1992)   
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•  The characteristics of the farm operations (because yf+c depends both on the cooperative 
production decision and on the on-farm investments) 
 
The member of the cooperative may have different evaluations of cooperative investments. In fact, 
by altering the distribution of yf+c (namely Et-1 and covt-1(R,yf+c)) the cooperative investment causes 
changes in the solutions of members’ umax problem that depends on individual characteristics. 
 
Section 3. The NGC investment decision. 
The Umax problem for a NGC is more complex because the farmer must solve the additional 
problem allocating the financial resources between the farm and the cooperative. While the investment 
in a TC is fixed, in a NGC the amount of financial resources that are invested in the cooperative is 
decided by the farmer. Also the amount of resources invested in the cooperative may affect the 






x x x µ − + µ
= µ
+ where x
c is not constant 
anymore. 
Moreover, unlike TC, in a NGC µf+c also depends on x
c and x
f  (i.e.  µf+c=µf+c(x
c,x
f)
  ). The 
membership does not grant the patron unlimited use of the cooperative, on the contrary, the delivery 
rights are proportional to the investment x
c. Then the returns of the cooperative portfolio depends not 
only on the total investment in the composed asset (as in TC) but also on the proportion of financial 

















































Summarizing the additional assumptions for the NGC case are:  
•  the cooperative participation is a continuous choice (i.e. is the expenditure for buying the 
delivery rights ) 
•  the functions f(x
c) - i.e. the minimum investment in the farm for the given investment in 
delivery rights -  and µf+c are continuous and differentiable on the domains x
c ∈[0,∝) , x
f 
∈[0,∝) 
•  If the farmer join the cooperative, then we have a new real asset: farm+cooperative that yields 
a return µf+c(ψ,x
f,x
c) which is a function of the state of nature, of the capital investment in the 
farm and the capital investment in the cooperative. As before such returns can be broken down 
in the return from farm operation (µf , i.e. the returns in absence of cooperative) and the 
differential cooperative return, µc , defined as above. 
 
Then, the umax problem can be written as  ( ) [ ] { } x R u E 1 t x
r
r , max ψ −   subject to: 








f x x x x x x R µ + ψ µ + ψ µ + ψ µ = ∑
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, ,  
W x x x x
0
1 k
k c f = + + + ∑
Ω
=
 (with equality, assuming local non satiation) 
( )
c f x f x ≥   with f(0)=0 and f(x
c)>0  ∀x
c>0 (participation  constraint)    (λ) 
x
f ≥ 0    (no short selling on farm asset)              (ρ) 
x
c ≥ 0  (no short selling on cooperative asset)            (γ) 
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  can be rewritten as: 
() () () () () R u
x x
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The condition can be interpreted as follows. The marginal benefit of an increase in the investment 
in the farm asset (the left hand side of the equation) has two components i) the increase is the returns 
on the aggregate cooperative portfolio (remember yf+c=yf  for x
c=0), plus ii) a “correction” term taking 
into account the marginal effect of the increase of x
f on the returns of the cooperative portfolio. 
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condition 2 can be written as: 
() () () () ()
( )
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Again, the condition implies that – for interior solutions – a farmer should invest in the 
cooperative as long the marginal benefit on the left hand side (increase in revenues from the 
cooperative portfolio) equals the marginal cost (increase in the total income risk). Both marginal 
benefit and marginal cost expressions take into account that the farmer invests in the cooperative asset 
by increasing the participation in the cooperative. 
 
 By applying a standard technique, conditions 1) and 2) can be used to find the optimal ratio 
between the investment in the farm and the investment in the cooperative. By dividing and rearranging 
the two conditions we have that at the solution, the following equality must hold: 
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The condition implies that – for interior solutions – the farmer should transfer resources from the 
farm to the cooperative until the marginal benefit is offset by the marginal cost. The marginal benefit 
is the  net increase of µf+c , the marginal cost is the net increase in risk (multiplied by a measure of risk 
aversion). 
As seen in the case of TC, the optimal investment in a NGC depends on the specific characteristics 
of the farmer. Condition 1) and 2) show that the solution is independent from individual preferences 
only if the participation constraint and the constraint on short selling of real assets are not binding. In 
this case, the differentiation via the financial portfolio can be used to achieve a condition that is 
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Ω
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1 k
k c f 1 t
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c f 1 t
c f
c f 1 t y y x y x x y R , cov var , cov   
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k 1 t y y x x y x y R , cov var , cov   
Note that the solution still depends on individual character of the farmer. In particular, the optimal 
investment is influenced by the set  Ω  (the set of available financial assets) and the probability 
distributions both of the farm returns and of the cooperative differential returns.  
 
Summarizing, the financial framework suggests that NGC members may use different interest rates for 
their investment evaluations. Also such rates may differ from CAPM. Therefore NGC institutions do 
not ensure homogeneous investment evaluations. 